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Question 
What are the lessons learned from situations when donor agencies, UN organisations, or NGO’s 
had to close humanitarian or public health programmes at short notice in protracted crises and/or 
conflict settings? 
 Are there good examples of a responsible exit from programming? 
 Where there are examples of poor exiting – what can we learn?  
 What are the key issues which should be prioritised in exiting a response? 
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Since humanitarian projects are intended to be temporary interventions responding to the needs 
of populations affected by crises, project closure is an inescapable component of humanitarian 
aid (Pal et al., 2019). The literature highlights various terminologies for responsible exits by 
humanitarian actors. Approaches vary across organisations with multiple ways to describe the 
process – including ‘graduation’, ‘handing over’, ‘phasing down’/‘out’/‘over’, ‘ramping down’, 
‘transition’, and ‘withdrawal’/‘closure’ (INTRAC, n.d.; Gross, 2014; WFP, 2015; Devereux et al., 
2016; Lewis, 2016; Ahmed et al., 2018: 10). Further, these terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably. Many organisations and the individuals involved in responses are looking for 
ideas on best exit practice, as it is not easy to do well (Hayman et al., 2016; INTRAC, n.d.). 
However, in the aid effectiveness agenda, very little is mentioned on how aid exits and phase-
outs should take place (Ahmed et al., 2018: 5).  
There are guides on humanitarian exits from USAID (Ahmed et al., 2018), WHO (2003) as well 
as non-government organisations (NGOs) such as C-SAFE (Gardner et al., 2005). Expects 
consulted for this rapid review confirmed that existing literature and guidance1 materials on exit 
strategies in international cooperation frequently recommend principles for good practice: 
- Plan for exit from the outset; 
- Think about sustainability early-on; 
- Consult with partners and stakeholders regularly (using assessments to monitor 
challenges), and 
- Communicate constantly. 
This rapid review has found examples of exits from non-profit organisations, NGOs, as well as 
government agencies. Key points to highlight are: 
 Three exit processes have been identified by a multi-donor evaluation (Slob & Jerve, 
2008) for different contexts, and reflecting different management challenges: exit from 
force majeure situations (i.e. crisis management); exit from aid-dependent countries 
(i.e. exiting in a way that takes care to allow externally funded activities to continue 
sustainably), and aid transformation in graduating countries (i.e. exit in the context of 
transforming bilateral relations). 
 Three broad approaches of exit processes undertaken by international non-government 
organisations (INGOs) are the Full Closure Model (used by EveryChild); the 
Localisation Model (used by CARE International), and the Devolved Programme 
Model (used by American Friends Service Committee [AFSC] to support continuity via 
local leadership) (Ahmed et al., 2018). 
 Possible transition processes are related to measurable indicators, such as phasing out 
food aid to a limited number of schools (BMZ, 2005; Gardner et al., 2005). However, 
phasing out is problematic when targeting poor and food-insecure people, who may not 
be food secure after the intervention (BMZ, 2005). 
 Developing and using short responsible exit criteria helped in a successful exit in 
Moldova (Morris, 2015). 
                                                   
1 See Appendix B for more on Guidance. 
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 Senior staff are critical points in an exit process (Hayman et al., 2016). This is due to the 
strong leadership needed (Slob & Jerve, 2008). 
 Operational shifts have been used successfully by the World Food Programme (WFP, 
2016) in Lao PDR (in a governmental coalition approach) and in conflict situations such 
as Côte d’Ivoire (with a single government partner). 
 Both donor and recipient capacities are important factors (Slob & Jerve, 2008). 
Institutional capacity on the recipient side is a key factor determining the success of exit 
processes, however, donor capacity is a weak point in many exit processes. 
 Ensuring the financial sustainability of local entities is a critical part of making 
transitions – and ultimately locally-led development - a success (Yamron, 2020). 
Investment of both staff time and financial resources are important in the exit process 
(Hayman et al., 2016). 
 Attempting a hasty exit can result in financial damage on both sides (i.e. donor and 
recipient) (Morris, 2015). In Peru, as the process was rushed (3-month period) and 
underfinanced, the exit by NGO EveryChild ended up dragging on, and required 
additional money for legal fees and staff time.  
In terms of evidence, the Stopping As Success (SAS) resources provide robust reviews, and ODI 
has resources that are more specific to donors. An evaluation should be conducted after a period 
of time has elapsed following the programme exit, to determine success. However, as funding is 
not usually programmed in this manner, exit strategies are rarely evaluated (Gardner et al., 2005: 
12). Also, there is little evidence, and very few systematic cross-country comparative reviews, on 
the transition from low-income status for specific economies (Engen & Prizzon, 2019). Any 
evidence that has been found is gender blind and does not focus on disability. 
2. Strategy approaches 
Since humanitarian projects are intended to be temporary interventions responding to the needs 
of populations affected by crises, project closure is an inescapable component of humanitarian 
aid (Pal et al., 2019). There are many reasons for the withdrawal of aid by international non-
government organisations (INGOs) from partners, projects, programmes, regions and countries 
throughout the world.2 These include funding cuts by donors, decisions to reduce support to 
middle-income countries, responding to difficult operating environments, and shifts in strategic 
direction at the organisational level. Because of the different terminologies used (see Appendix A 
for further details), the approaches (strategies) used for exits are also known by various names: 
Exit strategy 
Gross (2014: 1) states that although the term ‘exit strategy’ may capture the essence of the task 
at hand, it is “somewhat misleading” in that it covers only one component of overall action – 
and could be taken to imply a deadline (or even a pre-determined end) to investment in a 
particular country. 




This has been proposed as an alternative term, and also has an operational meaning, namely 
the change taking place between the end of a mission and the beginning of the activation phase 
of other instruments – i.e. how activities can be absorbed or taken over by other instruments, by 
donors or external partners – upon termination (Gross, 2014: 2). 
Graduation strategy 
C-SAFE used the term ‘graduation strategy’ to describe the graduation of beneficiaries (or 
communities) from a particular programme once they achieved the intended results (Gardner et 
al., 2005: 7). Thus, C-SAFE’s ‘graduation strategy’ was the specific plan describing how the 
beneficiary would be discharged from Targeted Food Assistance, assuring that achievement of 
the programme’s objective (with regard to that particular beneficiary) was not jeopardised, and 
that further progress toward that objective would be made.  
3. Examples of exit strategies 
Possible exit strategies 
Following a Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) intervention, Edelstein (2017)3 suggests that 
there are different types of exit strategies for international interveners. Most interventions involve 
a protracted exit that leaves behind some nominal force to enhance the security of the post-
conflict state or maintain the legitimacy of the norm of humanitarian intervention.4  
Possible exit strategies discussed in the literature are related to measurable indicators. For 
example, a report by the German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ) evaluating the WFP leaving Mozambique included: i) strengthening school production; ii) 
phasing out food aid to a limited number of schools; iii) cash for food substitution, and iv) training 
of boarding school principals in food procurement (BMZ, 2005: 51). However, this type of 
phasing out is problematic when targeting poor and food-insecure people who may not be food 
secure after the intervention (BMZ, 2005: 50). 
Slob and Jerve (2008: 14) have defined exit processes for three different contexts, reflecting 
different management challenges:  
 exit from force majeure situations: exit as crisis management;  
 exit from aid-dependent countries: exiting in a way that takes care to allow externally 
funded activities to continue sustainably, and 
 aid transformation in graduating countries: exit in the context of transforming bilateral 
relations. 
Each context requires different considerations for planning an exit strategy (Ahmed et al., 2018: 
10). For example, the Centre for Global Development (CGD); the United States Agency for 
                                                   
3 Edelstein D (2017). Exit strategies from R2P interventions. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION and the 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P): A conference sponsored by the John K. Castle Fund for Ethics and 
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4 Nomikos WG (2017). Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect: Yale MacMillan Center. 
https://macmillan.yale.edu/news/humanitarian-intervention-and-responsibility-protect 
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International Development (USAID) note a typology of seven possible transition types,5 and WFP 
has guidance for “Exit Strategies for School Feeding” and “Programme Options for Transition 
from Emergency Response.”6 
Exit evaluations 
Research shows that exit is incredibly hard to do well (Hayman et al., 2016: 12). To determine 
the success of an exit strategy, an evaluation should be conducted after a period of time has 
elapsed following the programme exit. In fact, the WHO (2003) recommend that an evaluation 
and/or lessons-learned exercise should be undertaken in all cases. However, since funding is not 
usually programmed in this manner, research shows that exit strategies are rarely evaluated 
(Gardner et al., 2005: 12). Therefore, the following is a brief summary of lessons learned from 
unsuccessful and successful attempts by various agencies: 
Unsuccessful exit examples 
Phase out – no/inadequate exit strategy & low funding: WFP Ethiopia 
Numerous discrete emergency operations (EMOPs) are implemented in the context of a longer-
term development programme. When each emergency is over, EMOPs are phased out. EMOP 
resources represent over 80% of WFP’s portfolio in Ethiopia (WFP, 2005: 37). However, in 
Ethiopia, exit strategies did not exist or were informal and not systematic. Therefore, support for 
some communities was phased out because of the reduction of funding (WFP, 2005: 26). 
Graduation – no hierarchical organisation & poor timetable: Eritrea 
As early as 1994, Eritrea outlined its vision for how to graduate from aid dependency. However, 
the disappointing conclusion from this research is that both recipient and donors failed to build on 
this by establishing a predictable and time-bound platform for development cooperation 
(Slob & Jerve, 2008: 159). This is a genuine general problem in aid, but in Eritrea, it was 
amplified by the subordination of aid to foreign policy strategies. 
Handover – no time and underfinanced: EveryChild Peru 
The closure of EveryChild’s office in Peru in 2010-11 was a particularly painful experience, 
according to INTRAC. They attempted to close this office which had been operating for 15 years 
within the space of just three months, and to transfer the remaining project activities over to a 
local NGO instead. The main reason for the closure was financial.7 Because the process was 
rushed and underfinanced, the exit ended up being prolonged and required additional money 
for legal fees and staff time (Morris, 2015: 3). 
                                                   
5 Boardman M (2008). Exit Strategies: Approaches and Challenges in Development. Conference paper, Southern 
Perspectives on Development: Dialogue or Division? The University of Otago, New Zealand. 
6 See Appendix B for more on Guidance. 
7 EveryChild needed to make substantial budget cuts following the financial crash. Peru was proving very hard to 
raise funds for in-country, as donors had shifted their funding away from the region (Morris, 2015: 3). 
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Successful exit examples  
Operation shift – strong partnerships & long-term planning: WFP in Mozambique, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Lao PDR 
These three countries are examples in which WFP shifted from operations under an EMOP, to 
protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), using different partnership approaches 
(WFP, 2016): 
In Mozambique, WFP partners with the government and NGOs. Emergency responses 
implemented over the past ten years have integrated training and institutional support for the 
national institute responsible for coordinating disaster response (Instituto Nacional de Gestão 
das Calamidades/ National Disaster Management Institute, INGC) and other government units. 
INGC has developed strong capacity and effective relief mechanisms at the national and 
provincial levels. WFP continues to support INGC preparedness and contingency planning. 
NGO partners have broader development goals: when emergencies occur, they mobilise 
resources for response and then return to their longer-term objectives, supporting populations 
who remain vulnerable as a result of emergency in the context of ongoing, longer-term 
programmes. NGOs provide credit and other non-food inputs as activities shift from relief to 
recovery.  
In the Lao PDR, WFP recognised limited government capacity as a serious constraint to 
emergency response and achievement of national food security. To strengthen this capacity, 
WFP pursued a coalition approach, engaging the government at all levels through training and 
on-the-job support. Building capacity in all aspects of assessment and implementation is a core 
component of the most recent EMOP, and an effective departure from previous EMOPs that 
channelled resources through NGO or government implementing partners without long-term 
support.  
WFP works with a variety of partners in Côte d’Ivoire, including local government, UN agencies, 
and INGOs. Limited capacity among partner agencies has been a major constraint affecting the 
EMOP strategy and shift to recovery programming. The context for capacity-building for the 
government has been limited to date by lack of clear structures; therefore, WFP has focused 
capacity-building efforts on one engaged and responsive government partner.  
Phase out – using current agreements: Danida in Botswana 
This was used by Denmark in Botswana as no overall long-term exit was planned. When the 
intention to exit was communicated in 1992, Botswana proposed a ministerial meeting, among 
other things, to discuss cooperation after the era of bilateral aid. The phasing-out plans that 
might have been agreed were, however, overtaken by events (i.e. disagreements over the 
transport project) that led to the Danish decision in 1994 not to make further funding available to 
Botswana for official bilateral assistance. Therefore, the exit was managed project by project, 
based on agreements still in force, in a way that did not damage ongoing work (Slob & Jerve, 
2008: 129). 
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Phase over – support groups: C-SAFE World Vision Zambia 
World Vision Zambia used Nutrition Support Groups (NSGs) as phase over approach to exiting 
(Gardner et al., 2005: 9). NSGs were identified as an exit approach for Home-Based Care 
programmes for Growth Monitoring & Promotion (GMP) and vegetable gardening activities. 
NSGs were trained to take over the activities and services that were provided under the C-SAFE 
World Vision programme.  
Phase Out & Phase Over – transition combination & monitoring: C-SAFE Malawi 
In June 2003, C-SAFE consortium members operating in Malawi proposed to transition out of the 
regional consortium one year early, with the goal of moving to a five-year country-specific 
Development Assistance Programme (DAP).  Programmatic coverage went from 23 districts 
under C-SAFE to eight under the new DAP, entitled I-LIFE. In preparation for I-LIFE, the partners 
engaged in a detailed targeting exercise to prioritise the most appropriate geographic regions of 
the country for inclusion in I-LIFE. Five indicators were analysed across the 27 districts of the 
country and aggregated to create a holistic picture of vulnerability and food insecurity (Gardner et 
al., 2005: 9).  
The five indicators included chronic malnutrition, HIV prevalence, the severity of poverty, food 
needs, and female literacy rates. The five indicators were consolidated into a vulnerability index, 
allowing consortium partners to initially prioritise 14 districts of the country for I-LIFE activities. 
Later, due to I-LIFE budget constraints, only the eight most vulnerable districts were selected. 
These eight districts (of the 23 original C-SAFE districts) currently receive services under the I-
LIFE/DAP. In essence, C-SAFE was phased out of 15 districts, while in eight, there was a phase 
over to a DAP.  
Sustainability - linkages with multiple agencies/leaders & monitoring: ADRA Zambia and 
CARE Zimbabwe 
The NGO ADRA Zambia formed linkages with the Ministry of Agriculture to conduct monitoring 
on its programme impact after the closure of C-SAFE (Gardner et al., 2005: 12).  
CARE Zimbabwe developed strong linkages with traditional leaders, AIDS Action Committees, 
and key government departments such as Agricultural Extension (AREX) services for continued 
technical advice on vegetable and fruit production, provision of seeds and basic tools (Gardner et 
al., 2005: 12). 
4. Local impacts of exits 
In their handover toolkit, the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) notes that “[s]uccess is also 
measured by what you leave behind” (Gerstenhaber (2014). This is because the impact of an exit 
on local communities can be long-reaching. However, research from the non-profit organisation 
Search for Common Ground has found that the term ‘local’ has different connotations in different 
contexts, and is a contested term (Yamron, 2020: 3). In Stopping as Success (SAS)’s research8, 
                                                   
8 SAS is a consortium consisting of Peace Direct, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, and Search for Common 
Ground, with support and funding from USAID. This three-year collaborative learning project looks beyond the 
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‘local organisation’ is used to refer to civil society organisations (CSOs) or NGOs in the global 
South that are undergoing a process of transition in their partnership with an INGO. This 
encompasses organisations that work at the local and national level. The broader term ‘local 
actors’ recognises the diversity of this group, which are outlined below: 
Individuals 
Staff: It is important for local staff to set the terms of the transition: INGOs may facilitate and fund 
the process, but true ownership is important for long-term sustainability (Yamron, 2020: 5). 
Local staff are often better positioned to identify potential directors (Yamron, 2020: 8).  
In the closing down phase, WHO (2008: 120) advises that support activities are monitored, e.g. 
the numbers of purchase requests, travel authorisations, HR actions, etc. being dealt with each 
month – and staffing levels be adjusted accordingly. Staffing requirements for the final stages 
of the recovery programme and future regular programme activities must be determined, and an 
HR plan drawn up to progressively transfer required staff from the emergency operation to other 
activities and to terminate others. The debriefing of staff must occur before they leave, and the 
compilation and analysis of their views on lessons to be learned. 
Experiences and reflections from British Red Cross, EveryChild, Oxfam GB, Sightsavers and 
WWF-UK conclude that developing exit principles, even near the end of a programme or project, 
is an opportunity to get senior management engaged in the daily realities of staff who are 
tasked with seeing through exits from projects, programmes, countries, regions, or partnerships 
(Hayman et al., 2016: 3). These managers must be supported, as they will be balancing staff 
changes as well as delivering on programmes that are coming to an end (Hayman et al., 2016: 
9). 
Assets: On completion of each emergency project, materials and equipment should normally be 
handed over as a donation to the Ministry of Health or another designated national entity, and not 
individuals or staff (WHO, 2008.; Hayman et al., 2016: 9). However, staff care during exit may 
require additional resources (Hayman et al., 2016: 10). 
Assets used for this can be financial or non-financial (e.g. knowledge assets) (Yamron, 2020: 5-
7): 
 Asset transfer can also be through fixed assets, which in certain contexts can be even 
more useful in the long-term than money. In Georgia, Oxfam bought office space for 
BRIDGE, part of which could be rented out, giving the local organisation a huge head 
start in the expensive Tbilisi real estate market since they wouldn’t have to find 
unrestricted funding to pay for rent. Along the same lines, World Vision Philippines 
brokered a free rent and utilities deal with a large local NGO so that the TB Federation 
could have a place to work. SAS has seen a wide variety of INGO actions that can fall 
under the umbrella of “asset transfer” (Yamron, 2020: 6). 
 Non-financial support can include transfers of key financial management and business 
development resources. PADCO’s financial management processes and advance 
planning systems, for example, were key to building the Ikibiri Coalition’s reputation as a 
reliable grantee. Similarly, Interpeace’s purchase of Quickbooks software has been 
                                                   
technical aspects of an exit strategy to identify examples that demonstrate a transition toward locally-led 
development (Ahmed et al., 2018: 4; Yamron, 2020: 3). 
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important for CEPAD’s financial management. To address a key gap in business 
development capacity, Oxfam gave BRIDGE access to their proposal databases, saying 
that since the learning embedded in those proposals was originally collected from the 
Global South, it was only fair to give it back. 
Communities 
Local economy: Delayed closure can result in harm to the local economy. In their scoping review, 
Pal et al. (2019) found that several commentators reported that prolonged assistance may 
entrench reliance on outside assistance, thus jeopardising the goal of a progressive return to 
autonomy (Lee & Özerdem, 2015 in Pal et al., 2019; Solidarités International, 2016), as well as 
contributing to inflation (Lee & Özerdem 2015 in Pal et al., 2019). However, no specific time point 
for closure was provided. 
Relationship expectations: Many cases found by SAS show the importance of keeping the 
relationship alive after transition. If formal arrangements are unrealistic, informal channels of 
advice, donor introductions, capacity development, and business development support can make 
the difference (Yamron, 2020: 7).  
Communication: Security and telecommunications elements must be maintained until all field 
activities that require staff presence in the field are completed (WHO, n.d.). In their scoping 
review, Pal et al. (2019) found that the most frequently expressed concerns were that decision-
making be conducted in ways that include and engage relevant stakeholders, that there is 
transparency in communication of the process, and that rationales for decisions are well justified 
and clearly articulated. In short phase outs – i.e. less than two years – hardly any attention was 
paid to participation and consultation of stakeholders (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 10). 
Language also matters - it can help to refer to “sustainability” plans rather than “exit plans” to 
frame discussions in a positive way (Morris, 2015: 8). The way the exit decision was conveyed to 
the partner country influenced the handling and outcome of the exit process. The level (political 
or administrative) used to deliver the message mattered. In some cases, politicians took the 
responsibility to communicate exit decisions. Although the partner country did not welcome the 
decision, it welcomed this way of conveying the message – in contrast to the cases where it was 
left to civil servants of different ranks to convey the news. Early warnings of exit decisions were 
rare. Indeed, in several cases the exit decision came as a surprise to the recipients. Most exit 
decisions were communicated by the donor as a fait accompli and also perceived as such by the 
partner country (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 10). 
CSOs/NGOs partnerships 
In post-conflict settings, projects focusing on long-term development and prevention are 
evaluated as best. Successful strategies include working with CSOs, ideally with clear exit plans, 
though this is rare (van Voorst & Hilhorst, 2017: 4). 
Post-exit support can also include a variety of activities aimed at making space for transitioning 
staff to think strategically about business models and organisational structures. For example, 
hiring an in-country lawyer to provide a complete analysis of the available models of association 
(e.g. NGO, community-based organisation, attached consulting or for-profit wing, social 
enterprise) can help teams think about different paths forward (Yamron, 2020: 4-5). 
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Involving stakeholders: The degree of participation of stakeholders in the planning and 
implementation of exit processes was found to be a good indicator for their success (Slob & 
Jerve, 2008: 10). 
Involving communities: Unless ‘exit’ is done in an inclusive and contextually specific way, it will 
never be locally owned. Responsible exit requires ‘responsible entry’ of others. Local 
stakeholders will need to step up into new levels of responsibility (Hayman et al., 2016: 12). 
EveryChild decided not to just pass on their NGO partners to other international donors, but to 
actively encourage them to link-up more with local government and local fundraising. 
Consequently, many programmes and activities (such as Child Activity Centres) are at least 
partially funded by local communities. 
NGOs devolved from international federations 
CARE International began to consider exiting from countries in the early 1990s, based on 
changes in national economies and at country-level. Their localised organisation model is led 
by local CARE staff. In Sri Lanka, for example, national CARE staff founded Chrysalis, which 
registered as a social enterprise in 2017. Discussions about a continued partnership with CARE 
with an external “exit expert” led to an MOU endorsing Chrysalis as an independent affiliate 
(Ahmed et al., 2018: 12).  
The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) used a devolved programme model for exit. 
This 9-month preparation started in 2008, for Asia, Central and South America and the 
Caribbean. This included assessments of local challenges and the development of hand-over 
plans, vetted through consultations with leadership from community-based organisations (CBOs). 
For example, devolved organisations in Haiti can continue to use AFSC branding post 2008 
(Ahmed et al, 2018: 12). Using the brand supported continuity and effectiveness, as it symbolises 
trust in local leadership and ongoing relationship.  
Local/national governments 
According to interviews with government officials and development partners, factors such as poor 
planning and institutional weaknesses have hampered the institution of strong sustainability 
mechanisms for exit strategies in Nigeria (Engen & Prizzon, 2019: 61).  
Vested interests: Alonso & Brugha (2006) found that different actors had different interests 
around allowing NGOs to continue playing a major role as health service providers. NGOs, often 
with limited strategic vision, are reluctant to leave this role in the hands of the government, 
arguing lack of capacity in their local counterparts. Some bilateral donors directly funding NGOs 
had an interest in their continuation, as this often constituted an excellent means for political 
visibility and increased accountability. 
Conflict dynamics: Power dynamics play an important role in shaping relationships between 
different aid actors, as well as the narratives and practices around exits and transitions (Ahmed 
et al, 2018: 7). Despite deep societal divides following a 25-year guerilla war and a political crisis 
in 2006, aid flows to Timor-Leste changed focus from peacebuilding to development. This 
pressured Belun to adapt its focus. Belun was, therefore, able to successfully branch out into 
related humanitarian and gender programming (Yamron, 2020: 4). 
Underlying humanitarian and conflict challenges: Gerstenhaber (2014) reports that the inclusion 
of other actors promotes ownership of the project as project activities are shifted to those who 
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will be responsible once the NGO leaves, even if doing so is “potentially frustrating and 
complicated”. Research from Pal et al. (2019) focuses on situations of humanitarian crisis arising 
from armed conflict, political instability, or natural disaster. They found that plans for project 
closure require adaptability in the face of the dynamic and evolving contexts of humanitarian 
crises, including responding to social contexts and ongoing conflicts. 
5. Conclusion: Key issues to prioritise 
Successful exits typically involve a mix of realistic timeframes, careful and mutual planning, 
consultation, and flexibility to set up arrangements for handing over or find alternative ways of 
financing (Gross, 2014: 2). However, this success will not be sustainable unless challenges are 
addressed. Based on the literature, the following is a list of key issues to focus on for donor 
agencies, UN organisations, or NGOs for closing humanitarian or public health programmes: 
In their evaluation, Slob and Jerve (2008: 14) recommend developing guidelines sensitive to 
exit processes in different contexts, and reflecting different management challenges (e.g. 
force majeure, aid-dependent countries, or graduating countries):  
Exits from aid-dependent countries are less successful in terms of sustainability (Slob & Jerve, 
2008: 13). However, in graduated countries where aid is less important, some positive 
consequences were reported when the national authorities took over or even expanded the 
activities started by the donors. This was especially the case in the Danish-supported Madhya 
Pradesh Women in Agriculture Project (MAPWA) in India. These phase-out strategies had a 
focus on sustainability: the extension approach towards female farmers was taken over, as was 
the community approach developed in the water sector (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 67).  
Countries often lack a plan for transitioning from aid.9 Developing principles can help to focus 
thinking and guide decision-making in responsible exits (Morris, 2015: 8). Since 2012, 
INTRAC has been developing a programme to offer practical support on exit strategies in 
response to an increasing number of withdrawals of aid programmes by INGOs around the world 
(Ahmed et al., 2018: 9). The three principles10 for their full closure responsible exit used by 
EveryChild were simple and flexible enough to be applied in different contexts, and provided an 
extremely effective framework for decision making (Morris, 2015: 5-6).  
Exit principles can provide reassurance and inspiration for partners as well as staff, and can help 
to smooth the “sharp end” of development work (Morris, 2015: 8). A systematic lack of exit 
                                                   
9 The ODI report Exit from aid: an analysis of country experiences (Engen & Prizzon, 2019: 12) notes that 
evidence and very few systematic cross-country comparative reviews of how volumes of development finance 
and terms and conditions evolve during the transition from low-income status for specific economies. In their in-
depth study of eight countries, some countries plan to implement a strategy (Ghana, with its ‘Ghana Beyond Aid’ 
strategy, and Nigeria, to a certain extent) or indirectly reflect some principles of the transition from LIC in other 
documents (e.g. Lao PDR). Other governments manage their financing options through a debt management 
strategy (even though the objective here is to minimise costs and financial risk, rather than act as a planning 
tool). 
10 “1. As far as possible, ensure the work we have done is sustainable – this could be continuation of services or 
lasting changes in children’s lives; 2. Ensure that exit does not have a detrimental effect on the children and 
communities where we work, and 3. As far as possible, ensure that expertise and momentum for change in the 
country is not lost” (Morris, 2015: 3). 
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strategies was noted in WFP-supported interventions, which affected the overall effectiveness 
and relevance (BMZ, 2005: 24). 
In many ways, getting the ‘entry’ of a mission right means getting also its ‘exit’ right – or at least 
determines the impact and success of its performance vis-à-vis an envisioned end-state for it. 
This requires setting achievable objectives and formulating realistic mandates early (Gross, 
2014: 2). 
Although agencies understand in general terms what constitutes an emergency situation, there is 
no definition of the moment when an emergency is over (WFP, 2005: 7). Triggers can be 
Programmatic (e.g. progress towards objective); Contextual (e.g. improvement in the overall 
humanitarian situation); Systemic (e.g. government capacity to meet needs and for emergency 
response), or External (e.g. donor funding) (WFP, 2005: 8). However clearly indicators are 
defined, it is sometimes difficult to know for certain that an exit is appropriate. Triggers must be 
part of an exit strategy that is flexible and allows discussion, qualitative appraisal and 
informed judgments by INGO and partner staff. 
NGOs have not been good at designing or implementing exit strategies, and they have been 
notoriously weak at sharing their experiences with others. A year-long INTRAC Action Learning 
Set (ALS) was formed in March 2014 in response to this problem (Hayman et al., 2016: 14). 
The aim should be to plan for sustainability/exit from the beginning of a new partnership - 
even if it is only a top-line conversation initially (Morris, 2015: 8). It is also important to ‘drip-feed’ 
information about exit regularly, and build-in face-to-face meetings where possible (James et 
al., 2015: 6).  
WFP (2005: 11-15) recommends planning for the worst (including when budgeting) but hoping 
for the best (Morris, 2015: 8). The Danish exit from Malawi with a six-month notice, for example, 
created a 40% shortfall in the agriculture sector budget, a major setback in agriculture sector 
programme development, which affected long-term agricultural research negatively (Slob & 
Jerve, 2008: 12). 
Flexibility on the side of the donor to adapt the budget for supported activities was shown 
to be another important factor in good exit management. This implies going beyond the ‘natural 
phase out’ approach to identify needs for adjustments in current agreements with a view to 
sustainability concerns. As the example of Denmark’s exit from India shows, the consequence 
may be a temporary increase in the volume of aid. There are examples of donors taking 
proactive steps to assist the recipient in securing alternative funding, but in most circumstances, 
other donors did not easily come forward (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 11). 
Mission planning has to consider a realistic lifespan for operations – which regularly exceed one 
year (Gross, 2014: 3). For example, the EU’s anti-piracy Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta had a 
planning cycle of twelve months but ended up entering its sixth year of operation. This reinforces 
the sense that the planning cycle does not match operational realities as to the likely duration of 
a mission (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 10). 
Successful exits were reported in Botswana, which is no longer dependent on aid. At the time 
when donors exited, activities were already managed by the government, though with some use 
of technical assistance. However, at the time of exit and in retrospect, the Government of 
Botswana argued that more time should have been allowed for phasing out of technical 
assistance (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 12).  
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Research shows that when a realistic timeframe was set and the exit was allowed to take time, 
attention was given to sustainability and mitigation of adverse consequences. This involves long-
term planning, careful consultation of all stakeholders, and good monitoring of results (Slob & 
Jerve, 2008: 11).  
Adopting a longer-term view would help to align the very different planning and operational 
cycles among actors and avoid ‘gaps’ (Gross, 2014: 3; Morris, 2015: 8; WFP, 2005: 11-15). The 
positive impacts of humanitarian aid will be undermined by a short-term mindset since abrupt 
exits leave local communities without access to services on which they have come to depend for 
survival (Ashley & Jayousi, 2006 in Pal et al., 2019). If exiting quickly for financial reasons, then a 
very different outcome is more likely than if a managed exit over time is adopted (Morris, 2015: 
8). For monitoring, vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) should be prioritised (i.e. use to 
signal when food assistance should be phased out).  
Aid exits should be based mainly on development merits (of continuing a programme or not) and 
not on political ones (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 159). However, Slob and Jerve (2008: 9) state that exit 
decisions are always political. The decision to exit is usually made by the donor unilaterally.  
Incomplete knowledge of a host country and/or programmes already in place and undertaken by 
others may lead to the duplication of efforts or the setting of unrealistic goals – potentially 
causing the need to adjust mandate and tasks once the mission has already started, as 
happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Afghanistan (Gross, 2014: 3). Therefore, these 
planning documents can then also be used to define a tentative end-state for the mission. 
For example, the adoption of a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) entails combining 
political and operational elements – but also civilian and military expertise and input – to define 
common objectives. 
Too often, projects in settings of conflict and disaster fail to address the root problems of these 
crises, such as weak governance/institutions and vulnerability of communities. Another reason 
for the unsustainability of projects is the fact that they continue to be externally driven and 
run by foreigners rather than locals and that clear, implemented exit plans remain scarce. This 
points to a major issue that hinders effective aid in today’s world: the assumption that external 
actors have the capacity to identify the appropriate entry points and engineer reforms in the right 
direction, simultaneously solving both the technical policy problem and that of adapting it to 
political constraints (van Voorst & Hilhorst, 2017: 30). 
Institutional capacity on the recipient side is a key factor determining the success of exit 
processes. Lack of capacity poses challenges to both the partner country and the donor. It 
appears that donors tend to underestimate the capacities of the recipient, and, in most cases, did 
not carry out institutional assessments to identify needs for building capacities that would 
enable the partner country institutions to cope with the exit (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 11). 
The Slob and Jerve evaluation also identified donor capacity as a weak point in many exit 
processes. This has three aspects: there has been scant attention to institutional learning on how 
to manage aid exit and transformation; aid exit is often perceived as a negative process in which 
there are few rewards for good management, and exit decisions are often accompanied by 
immediate downsizing of embassies or, in some instances, even closure. 
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Appendix A:  Definitions of exit terms used in the literature 
Exit approaches vary across organisations.11 The following is a list of the multiple ways used in 
the literature (with some overlap) to describe these processes:  
Graduation 
Graduation implies withdrawing support – a ‘one-way door’ out of the programme (Devereux et 
al., 2016). ‘Responsible graduation,’ therefore, means implementing graduation in such a way 
that the livelihoods are strengthened and supported. However, local organisations in some 
countries (e.g. Bangladesh and Columbia) have taken issue with these arguments, seeing 
graduation as an excuse to cut needed development funding, rather than a reflection of real 
progress (Yamron, 2020: 4).  
Handing over 
Projects can be handed over (i.e. transferred to) a local partner at the end of a response 
(Gardner et al. 2005; Lee and Özerdem 2015 in Pal et al., 2019). This often means that the 
response acts in a ‘bridging’ capacity (explicit from the beginning), with partners then eventually 
taking over or absorbing these activities (Gross, 2014: 4). Beyond the UN, other potential 
handover partners include NATO, the African Union (AU), or EU member states who may wish to 
‘Europeanise’ previously bilateral activities (as occurred in Afghanistan when Italy and Germany 
transferred respective efforts in the fields of justice and police reform). Prior coordination is 
crucial for both the handover process itself and for the smooth functioning of any follow-on 
mission. 
Phasing down/over/out or Operational shifts 
Projects can phase down (reducing services gradually but maintaining a small presence), phase 
out (tapering services before closing), or phase over (also termed ‘hand over’) (Gardner et al. 
2005; Lee and Özerdem 2015 in Pal et al., 2019). The Danish donor (Danida) exit plan from India 
is a good example of a comprehensive exit plan: ‘natural phasing out’ was the most common 
model used, which means that ongoing commitments are respected, and donor-supported 
activities are ‘faded out’ at the end of the agreement period (Slob & Jerve, 2008: 10). 
The NGO C-SAFE12 used all three of the basic approaches to exit strategies (i.e. phasing down, 
phasing out, and phasing over). The NGO Peace Direct understands the term “exit strategy” to 
describe complete ‘phasing down’ of programming and organisational presence (leaving the 
space completely) or ‘phasing over’ to a local entity (Ahmed et al., 2018: 9). For the INGO 
World Food Programme (WFP), an exit from an emergency response (EMRO) means either (i) a 
phase-out – that is, withdrawal of WFP assistance from an emergency operation or a country, 
or (ii) a shift to longer-term programmes to protect and improve livelihoods and resilience 
(WFP, 2005: 4).  
                                                   
11 Other terms include winding down, wrapping up, moving on, and spin offs (INTRAC, n.d.). 
12 The Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency (C-SAFE) was established in 2002. It comprised of 
World Vision, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services. It led the way in implementing a monitoring and evaluation 




The INGO CARE International uses the term ‘presence’ to denote a broader conception of their 
role. This invites a more explicit acknowledgement of entrance and existence of INGOs, and, by 
extension, exits (Ahmed et al., 2018: 9). 
Ramping down/transfer  
In the ‘ramp‐down’ stage, agencies are focusing on their exit strategy, including the transfer of 
operations to local actors (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009: 557). Therefore, collaboration is 
important. 
Sustainability 
Some organisations (e.g. the non-profit Project Concern International) prefer the word 
‘sustainability’, as the term ‘exit’ can create a barrier to maintaining a positive relationship with 
their local partners, or because they see exiting as a process rather than an event (Gardner et 
al., 2005: 4; Ahmed et al., 2018: 9).  
Transition 
A programme transition is defined as the change from one type of assistance programme to 
another (Gardner et al., 2005: 7). In the C-SAFE context, it often connotes the change from 
programme emphasis on one type of food assistance to another (i.e. General Food Distribution 
[GFD] to Targeted Food Assistance [TFA]) and usually indicates the scaling-down of resources. 
Conversely, a programme transition could also refer to the change from a food assistance 
programme to another type of programming (i.e. non-food). 
This term is used by World Vision, Project Concern, and UNESCO, rather than ‘exit’. However, 
World Vision acknowledges that these terms could be used interchangeably (Ahmed et al., 2018: 
10). Nevertheless, the ODI found little evidence and very few systematic cross-country 
comparative reviews of how development finance and terms and conditions evolve during the 
transition from low-income status for specific economies – even though 35 low-income 
countries have transitioned to middle-income country status over the past 15 years (Engen & 
Prizzon, 2019). 
Withdrawal/ Closure 
The UK-based non-profit organisation INTRAC, based on research from  the British Red Cross, 
EveryChild13, Oxfam GB, Sightsavers, and WWF-UK, uses the following definition: “[A] tool used 
by INGOs and their southern partners to plan and structure the implementation of an exit – 
                                                   
13 EveryChild was a UK international development charity, which closed in September 2016. In 2012, the 
organisation took the decision to close all of its international programmes, and to transfer income and assets to a 
new global alliance of national organisations (Family for Every Child). INTRAC is conducting a three-part 
evaluation of EveryChild’s Responsible Exit Process in four countries - Cambodia, India, Malawi, and Nepal - to 
see which partners and programmes remained up to 15 months after EveryChild's exit. The evaluation was 
specifically asked to focus on the more complex exits from longer partnerships (INTRAC, n.d.). 
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typically the withdrawal of financial resources or closure of an office – in a specific project, 
programme, country or region” (Lewis, 2016; Ahmed et al., 2018: 9).  
Appendix B: Guidance on strategies  
Responsible exits are not easy (INTRAC, n.d.). In the aid effectiveness agenda, very little is 
mentioned on how aid exits and phase-outs should take place (Ahmed et al., 2018: 5). Many 
organisations involved in humanitarian responses, as well as the individuals within them, are 
looking for ideas on best practice (INTRAC, n.d.). Guidance is available from different agencies 
and organisations. Different approaches are used, and various roles for specific 
staff/governments etc. are listed – however, these are not prioritised: 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC): exit strategy  
 “The exit strategy is primarily a process of moving from emergency to rehabilitation and 
development addressing a change in the roles of the UN agencies and other 
humanitarian organisations in the country, thus affecting the functions their respective 
staff may play in the country.” 
 “The exit strategy from a relief operation will be better guaranteed where and when the 
Governments capacity is in place to take over the care of the victims of complex or 
major emergencies. This capacity should not be limited to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance but must include the protection of the victims.” 
 “The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator should be charged with determining, in 
consultation with the in-country team and the Government, whether the conditions are 
met to proceed with total or partial exit strategy” (IASC, 1997: 1, 3). 
Sphere Association: exit strategy 
The Sphere Handbook underlines the importance of careful planning and implementation of 
closures, directing humanitarian organisations to “plan a transition or exit strategy in the early 
stages of the humanitarian programme that ensures longer-term positive effects and reduces the 
risk of dependency” (Sphere Association, 2018: 60). 
World Food Programme (WFP): exit strategy 
WFP exit strategies should contain: criteria for exit; measurable benchmarks for assessing 
progress toward meeting the criteria; steps for reaching the benchmarks, and identification of 
those responsible for taking these steps; periodic measures for the assessment of progress 
towards criteria and possible modifications based on analysis of potential risks, and a flexible 
timeline specifying when these benchmarks will be reached and when the assessments will be 
conducted (WFP, 2005: 6). 
World Health Organization (WHO): phase down/out strategy 
In principle, emergency humanitarian activities should be phased out when the exceptional 
needs arising from the emergency no longer exists and normal health and related services, 
together with ongoing development activities, can meet the needs of the population. Ideally, there 
would be a smooth transition from relief through recovery and into normal and development 
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activities. In practice, humanitarian assistance sometimes has to be phased down, and perhaps 
even out, earlier because of a lack of resources (WHO, 2003). The guiding principle from WHO 
(2003) is that the phasing out of emergency assistance and activities must be envisaged from an 
early stage of the operation – preferably at the time when projects are planned. The phasing 
out of individual activities and the whole emergency programme and operational set-up (including 
any field sub-offices) must be carefully planned and managed.  
 
